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LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROHIBIT CERTAIN RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS
IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF LABOR.
Has a state legislature the power to prohibit stipulations in
labor contracts, whereby the employee agrees not to join a labor
organization during the time of his employment?
The recent negative answer to this question by the Supreme
Court of the United States" might at first seem merely one of
the many cases in which courts have been compelled, on the basis
of reasonableness, to effect a compromise between the funda-
mental right of freedom of contract and the conflicting police
power of the state, the result depending more upon the judicial
attitude of mind than upon any certain course of legal reasoning.
So the matter was regarded by the dissenting judges in the case.
2
'Coppage v. Kansas, U. S. Adv. Ops. for 1914, p. 24o, Holmes, Day, and
Hughes, JJ.,- dissenting.2 Id. 248, 249, opinions of Holmes, J., and Day, J.
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Such too was evidently the opinion of the public press, as indi-
cated by a plenteous bestowal of the conventional epithets in
praise or censure. In fact, however, far from being, the fortui-
tous result of a clash of conflicting judicial tendencies, this case
presents, with hitherto unequalled clearness, a sharply defined
cleavage between two irreconcilable lines of constitutional
interpretation.
Does the constitution afford an inflexible barrier against that
species of legislation which seeks to promote the general welfare
by a compulsory reapportionment of bargaining advantages
between certain classes? Or, do the constitutional guarantees of
liberty and property mean here, as they confessedly do in the
great majority of cases, merely that liberty and property shall
not be abridged in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner, nor
for other than a public end? Admittedly these rights are
abridged at some point by the police power and other powers of
the state. Is it also true that the police functions of the state
are in turn limited by a fixed boundary, beyond which the public
nature of the end sought, and the reasonableness of the means
used, become irrelevant inquiries? Or is the sole protection
against all forms of aggression to lie in the reasonable discretion
of the legislature, as approved by the judges in the exercise of
that residuum of conservative sentiment surviving the contem-
plated process of education in the "new legal justice"?
We are not here concerned with the innumerable statutes
designed to remove or mitigate certain specific consequences of
an alleged oppressive inequality of economic conditions.3 Acts
regulating interest rates on loans, regulating the hours of employ-
ment, limiting the medium, or even the. basis, of compensation,
compelling the payment of wages up to date upon discharge, for-
bidding the imposition of fines, prohibiting certain contracts of
an oppressive tendency, prescribing new duties of insurance, safe-
guarding competition, regulating business "charged with a public
use," compelling the guaranty of deposits in a field admittedly
open to an extensive public control,-all these are merely attempts
to remove certain facts from the oppressive operation of financial
inequality. They attempt no artificial equalization in the general
bargaining advantages of parties. They involve no repudiation
'Harbison v. Iron Co., 1o3 Tenn. 42I; R. R. Co. v. Kilpatrick, 74 Vt.
288; for an elaborate review see McGuire v. R. R. Co., 131 Iowa 340,
360 ff.
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of the principle of inequality. They merely restrict its operation
with reference to specific subject-matters. Here, indeed, the
sole constitutional question is, May the legislature in the exercise
of a sound discretion consider, first, the end an object of public
concern; second, the means reasonably appropriate to the end?'
A very different situation is presented in the principal case.
No one would contend that the prohibited condition there con-
sidered was in itself oppressive. The sole relation of the pro-
hibitive statute to the public welfare consists in its inevitable
tendency to compel the employer to deal with aggregations instead
of with individuals. In this matter only could it be effective
for any protective purpose. From this view-point it was much
more than a removal of certain facts from the operation of eco-
nomic inequality; it in effect declared that inequality per se
inimical to the public welfare and proceeded accordingly to its
enforced alteration.
Such a legislative undertaking puts to a severe test the ade-
quacy of numerous judicial and extra-judicial utterances on the
relation of individual rights and legislative powers.
5 The state-
ments by the dissenting judges that "enactments are only to be
set aside when they involve such palpable abuse of power and
lack of reasonableness to accomplish a lawful end that they may be
said to be merely arbitrary and capricious and hence out of place
in a government of laws and not of men, and irreconcileable with
the conception of due process of law; ' ' 8 and again "if that
belief" (that membership in a union is essential to a fair bar-
gain) "whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man,
it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish
the equality of position between the parties in which liberty of
contract begins" ;7 -these in substance merely reiterate the preva-
lent mode of expression. No objection is made to these utter-
'Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 663; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133,
136; Booth v. People, 184 U. S. 425, 429; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6,
6o8; Lochner v. N. Y"., x98 U. S. 45, 53; R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
CoM., 221 U. S. 612, 61g.
5Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366,
391; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; R. R. Co. v. Drainage Con.,
200 U. S. 561, 592; Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 66; Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 29 U. S. 1o4, iii; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S.
225; see Francis J. Swayze, Judicial Construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 26 Harv. Law Rev. 1, 12.
'Principal case, p. 250, opinion of Day, J.
I Id., p. 248, opinion of Holmes, J.
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ances with reference to the situation usually before the courts.
Owing, however, to the fact that in nearly every litigated case
the test which they apply is entirely adequate, judges have drifted
into the habit of speaking as if it were not merely the usual but
the universal criterion of constitutionality under the "due
process" clauses.
The principal case explicitly repudiates this position. "The
Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that a state shall not
'deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law' . . . recognizes 'liberty' and 'property' as coexistent
human rights, and debars the states from an unwarranted inter-
ference with either. And since a state may not strike them down
directly, it is clear that it may not do so indirectly, as by declaring
in effect that the public good requires the removal of those
inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their
exercise, and their invoking the police power to remove the
inequalities, without other object in view. The police power is
broad and not easily defined, but it cannot be given the wide
scope that is here asserted for it, without in effect nullifying the
constitutional guaranty. . . . The mere restriction of liberty
or of property rights cannot of itself be denominated 'public
welfare,' and treated as a legitimate object of the police power;
for such restriction is the very thing that is inhibited by the
Amendment.""
The holding here involved is in line with an almost unbroken
course of decisionsY In language, however, the case is signifi-
cant as an at least partial emancipation from the confusing
judicial tendency above mentioned, and from the still more con-
fusing tendency to assert, in cases of this kind, that the object
in view is not a public one and therefore not germane to the
police functions of the state.10 It could hardly be maintained
that the adjustment of the relations of the great industrial classes
might not be, or become, or be reasonably believed to be, a
matter of genuine public concern." Nor could the means chosen
8 Id., p. 245, opinion of Pitney, J.
'State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; Gillespie v. People, i88 Ill. 176; People
v. Marcus, 185. N. Y. 257; State v. Kreutzberg, H4 Wis. 530; Adair v.
U. S., 208 U. S. 161. Cf. Wallace v. R. R. Co., 94 Ga. 732. Contra, Davis
v. State, 3o Wkly. Law Bul. (Ohio) 342. But see State v. Bateman, 7
Ohio N. P. 487; unreported case, supreme court of Ohio, May 4, 1915.
"State v. Kreutzberg, supra.
'Cf. Adair v. U. S., supra, dissenting opinion of McKenna, J.
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by the legislature be regarded as necessarily inappropriate to the
end in view. If, as has been seriously contended and sometimes
in substance held, the promotion of unionism may be an end
sufficient to justify a prima facie tort,'2 and if, as has been held,
a legislative exemption of union labor from the operation of the
anti-trust laws may be upheld as a not unreasonable classification
in the public interest,1 3 it would be no long step to the assertion
that the propagation of this form of labor is of sufficient public
importance to become an appropriate subject for fostering legis-
lation. Certainly there would be no guaranty that future judges
would, on the score of reasonableness, continue to condemn such
measures.
That "due process of law" is exclusive of arbitrary legislative
enactments has long been a closed question." Despite all the
criticism that has been passed upon this interpretation, it was
in truth nothing short of a logical necessity. What are the rights
of liberty and property thus guaranteed? Liberty and property
free from legislative control they could not be in civil society;
liberty and property protected from the tender mercies of legis-
lative caprice they must be, if the words were to have any rational
and effective place in an instrument declared to be the "supreme
law." The courts could not, therefore, have done otherwise than
to draw the flexible and variable line between reasonable and
arbitrary legislation.
But if this construction was imperatively demanded in order
to effectuate the purpose of the amendment, what shall be said
concerning that type of legislation which is enacted, not in
capricious disregard, but in deliberate repudiation, of the rights
of liberty and property, by proceeding on the assumption that
these rights, with the inevitably consequent financial inequality,
are themselves adverse to the public welfare? This is nothing
less than an undertaking to pass judgment on the policy of the
constitution itself, which, if admitted at all, could stop at nothing
short of the annihilation of the constitutional limitations, unless
the courts should permit themselves to drift into the logically
impossible position, now sometimes suggested, of making the
" See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, io8, dissenting opinion of
Holmes, J.; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 5o5, dissenting opinion of same
judge.
"State v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. i. Contra, Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540.
'Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. (U. S.) 272, 276.
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entire question between private rights and legislative powers, one
of quantity and of degree. 15
The principal case is a marked departure in the direction of
a clearer enunciation of the true meaning of the "due process"
clauses of the constitution. Under its authority there can be
no compromise between the constitutional language and the legis-
lative redistribution of economic advantage. Not through a
drifting transformation of social ideas, but by the self-conscious
process of amendment, must such an end be achieved.
Should the amending power be confronted with such a pro-
gram, the facts of the principal case would suggest a pertinent
inquiry, whether legislative "equalization" may not mean the
substitution of a different and perhaps more oppressive inequality.
LOST CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT.
Shall the owner of a lost certificate of deposit payable to the
order of self and claimed by him not to have been indorsed be
compelled to give a bond of indemnity to the bank before being
entitled to receive the money on the certificate which had not
matured when lost, but had matured before time of the trial?
This question arose in the case of the German National Bank v.
Moore,' and was answered in the negative. The facts of the
case were briefly these. The defendant in error, Moore, deposited
at the bank the sum of $4,ooo and received a certificate of deposit
in this form.
"R. H. Moore has deposited with us four thousand
($4ooo) dollars, payable to the order of self twelve months
after date with interest to maturity only. . . . upon the
return of this certificate properly indorsed."
When the depositor was about to leave on a journey he took
the certificate with him. By an accident it was lost at a railway
ticket office and its loss was discovered while Moore was on the
train. He immediately wired and wrote the bank about his loss,
giving them full particulars. He made an unsuccessful effort
to find the certificate. After the certificate became due, he
demanded payment of the bank, but the latter refused unless the
depositor would furnish an indemnity bond. This Moore was
unable to do. Moore testified that the certificate was unindorsed
' See Noble State Baink v. Haskell, supra, IIO.
1 173 S. W. (Ark.) 4oi.
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at the time he lost it. On this point there was no other evidence.
The court held that the question whether Moore should be com-
pelled to give an indemnity bond is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and that under these circumstances, he did
not have to furnish an indemnity bond.
Was the court right in so deciding? The answer to this ques-
tion depends in turn on another question. "Is the fact that the
certificate was unindorsed res adjudicata against the whole
world?" The case of the First National Bank of Denver v.
Wilder3 was very similar to the principal case in its facts. In
the course of its opinion the court said: "The finding of the jury
that the certificate was unindorsed by the payee rests upon fallible
human testimony which might be discredited by another jury
called to determine this same issue in a suit by a third party
against the defendant on the certificate." This finding would
neither operate as an estoppel nor would it even be admissible in
evidence in a suit by a third party against the defendant. Con-
tinuing, the court said: "No prudent banker on the facts dis-
closed by the record would pay the certificate voluntarily without
proper indemnity; and what a prudent man would not do
voluntarily, surely a court should not compel the defendant
bank to do. . . . Reasonable security against its further
appearance should be required unless the proof that the
paper has been actually destroyed i so cogent that there is prac-
tically no risk of its reappearance." The person who has lost a
negotiable instrument or certificate of deposit which has the same
characteristics as a negotiable note, should not be allowed to cast
the burden of his misfortune upon the bank, but should be com-
pelled to tender a reasonable indemnity. There is no conflict of
authority on the requirement of the indemnity bond when the
instrument lost before maturity is negotiable, and is payable to
bearer on its face, or by reason of a blank endorsement.
3
Certainly whatever possibility of damage there is ought to be
borne by the owner of the lost instrument rather than by the
bank. As long as there is a possibility that the certificate was
indorsed, then the bank should be protected from every single
2 104 Fed. 187.
'Hedricks v. White Cotton, 6o Mo. App. 171; Hinckley v. Union Pacific
R. R., 129 Mass. 52; Kirkwood v. Bank, 40 Neb. 484; Wiedenfeld v. Gala-
glzer, 24 S. W. (Tex.) 333; Bridgeport v. Mason Co., 34 Conn. 546;
Schmidt v. Bank, 153 Mass. 530; Lodge v. Bank, 7 Pa. Sup. Ct. 552;
Pierson v. Hutchinson, 2 Camp. 211; Ex parte Greenway, 6 Vesey, Jr. 812.
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avenue of liability. It has done nothing to be placed in a position
which may ultimately result in a loss. As between the plaintiff
who lost possession of the instrument and the defendant bank, itis but fair, that the former should bear the burden of possiblefuture demands predicated by others upon the instrument.
In the case of Bank v. Brown, 4 where a similar question wasinvolved, the majority held that a bond was not necessary. Thedissenting opinion on this point said: "Nor can the case of thedefendant be maintained upon the claim and finding that the cer-tificate was unindorsed at the time of the alleged loss. The
record in this case binds none but the parties to it. It is possible
that the certificate may have been indorsed for value by the payeebefore the loss. But even if not indorsed by his genuine signa-
ture heretofore, it is possible to be put on hereafter; and even
upon a forged indorsement, the bank could be put to the trouble
and expense of defending an action with the possibility and risk
of an erroneous finding of the fact against it.
Great weight should be placed upon the fact that the finding ofthe jury in the principal case binds only the parties to the suit
and not the outside world. It is not res adjudicata against the
whole world. When the plaintiff Moore, in the principal case,
testified, he had his own pecuniary interest at stake. He wasthe person most vitally interested in the result. He testified that
the instrument was unindorsed. Assuming that he was honest,
this was at most only his opinion or recollection. But there still
remains the possibility that it was not unindorsed and that theplaintiff was honestly mistaken when he testified. Frequently in
a case two people testify diametrically opposite on the same
subject matter and both do so in good faith. Suppose two years
after the bank has paid the certificate without an indemnity bond,Moore should become a bankrupt and be out of the jurisdiction.Let us also assume that the instrument turns up with an "indorse-
ment" upon it. What is the result? The bank makes an effortto defend, and what testimony has it to rebut this "indorsement?"
It cannot introduce the judgment in the previous case. And ifit is unable to find the plaintiff Moore, then it has absolutely no
means to defend the second suit, and it is compelled to pay twicebecause of the fault of another in no way attributable to itself.And even if it succeeds in defending, it must suffer loss of time,
attorney fees, and receive in the community the reputation of
445 Oh. St. 39.
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resisting an honest claim. It is against such results that the
bank ought to be protected.
The case of Zander v. New York Trust Co.' is different from
the principal case in one very important respect. In that case,
the certificate of deposit was payable to Zander and "her assigns,
on return of this certificate, which is assignable only on the books
of the company. The court held that this certificate was non-
negotiable and that the bank would be protected in paying the
depositor without requiring an indemnity bond because payment
before notice of assignment would be a defense against an
assignee. But in the principal case, the possibility that the instru-
ment was indorsed and in the hands of a holder in due course
still existed.
In the case of Matthews v. Matthews,6 involving a similar
question, the court said: "While the proof is sufficient to author-
ize a finding in the plaintiff's favor, it is not to be assumed
conclusively that the note will never appear and that the defend-
ant will be subjected to no further risk, loss or expense on
account of it. . . . The plaintiff should be defaulted for the
amount of the note in suit, and the case continued for judgment
from term to term until the note is barred by the statute of limita-
tions, or until the plaintiff furnishes the defendant such indemnity
as the court shall order and determine."
It must be conceded that there are many cases which hold that
in a case like the principal case the plaintiff need give no bond
of indemnity.7 The argument that an instrument payable to
order and "not indorsed," will cause the bank no harm is founded
on a fallacy. It assumes as an absolute fact and one that cannot
be disputed by another party in another proceeding that the cer-
tificate was unindorsed. But the lack of indorsement is not a
fact which is res adjudicata against the whole world. Nor can
the court know that it is an absolute fact, for it has only the
testimony of the party most vitally interested in the result.
I178 N. Y. 208.
'97 Me. 4o.
1Mossop v. Eadon, I6 Vesey, Jr. 430; Warner v. Bailey, IO A. & E. 616;
Bank v. Tillman, 12 Ala. 214; McMillan v. Bethold, 35 Ill. 1254; Bank v.
Brown, 45 Oh. St. 39; Bank v. Ruyel ("payable in currency held to be
non-negotiable"), 5, Ind. 393; Kirkwood v. Bank, 4o Neb. 484; Palmer v.
Carpenter, 53 Neb. 394; Abone v. Bosworth, i R. I. 4o; Mackey v. Mackey,
16 Colo. 134.
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This matter of indemnity bonds is one that is regulated in some
states by statute. Some of them cover instruments negotiable in
their origin and some where the instrument is non-negotiable and
some where the instrument continues negotiable."
It may be that the cost of a surety bond for the period fixed
by the statute of limitations would be fairly expensive, but when
compared with the $4ooo is relatively small. The parties are
then fully protected. According to the Matthews v. Matthews9
case, the money might be paid into court and by it deposited in
several banks. This sum will draw interest, which could accu-
mulate and so save the plaintiff interest, especially since the
deposit did not bear interest after twelve months.
It would seem, then, that the principal case is wrong.
" New York, Missouri, California, Massachusetts, Alabama, Maryland.
97 Me. 4o.
